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The original 1965 Restatement of Foreign Relations Law contains two
reporters' notes on the environment.1 By contrast, the Third Restate-
ment 2 devotes all of Part VI to this increasingly important area of the
law and foreign relations. Unfortunately, the resulting product consti-
tutes only a modest step toward presenting the foreign relations law of
the United States pertaining to the environment. Part VI takes a narrow
view of the law of the environment, limiting itself to. transfrontier pollu-
tion and, even then, relegates most of the discussion of conventional law
to reporters' notes.3 This brief review assesses the structure and sub-
stance of Part VI.
As a symbolic step, Part VI is to be applauded. As a restatement of
the foreign relations law of the United States pertaining to the environ-
ment, it oversimplifies and sometimes muddies the waterways of the law.
I. The Restatement Takes a Narrow View of the Scope of the Law of
the Environment
Part VI is entitled "The Law of the Environment," but in fact its scope
is considerably more narrow. A more accurate title would have been
"The Law of Transfrontier Pollution with a Particular Emphasis on
Marine Pollution."
Humanity has long known of its ability to change its environment.
Woodlands have been pushed back and rivers have been tamed for
thousands of years. Likewise, the local environmental costs of such de-
velopment-such as polluted rivers-have been recognized for a long
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(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
3. This narrow scope is reflected in the modest bulk of Part VI, by far the shortest Part of
the Restatement in terms of pages or sections.
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time. Only recently, however, have we come to appreciate that there is
little wilderness left to be pushed back, that some waterways have suf-
fered very long lastifig damage, and that the often wasteful way we live
threatens all our futures.
In this sense, the law of the environment is not concerned solely with
transfrontier pollution, but rather more generally with the preservation
and optimum use of the carrying capacity of this planet, In legal dis-
course, this evolution has been reflected in an expanding notion of what
is perceived to be at stake. For example, in the Trail Smelter arbitration
in the first half of this century, damages were awarded for commercial
losses suffered by U.S. nationals.4 Although the losses claimed were the
result of damage to the environment, the suit was not aimed at environ-
mental protection. Rather, the suit involved a traditional- action in tort
complicated by the presence of an international boundary. The arbitra-
tion focused on the immediate economic damage and not on the more
diffuse harm to the environment that would manifest itself only after
much time or at the end of a trail of causation that legal processes would
find difficult to follow. 5 However, the limited focus on the environment
in this case was as much a result of the priorities of the parties as the
limits of judicial process. By contrast, the settlements by Sandoz Chemi-
cal for its December, 1986 spill of chemicals into the Rhine included
payment for the cost of restoring the environment. 6 Indeed, as humanity
believes increasingly that in a theoretical sense the planet belongs to all
and that in a real sense it will someday belong to its children, the notion
of legitimate interests seems to extend far beyond traditional notions of
harm. Consequently, there is a perception that all have an interest in
preventing the loss of a species, the destruction of cultural heritage, and
the waste of natural resources. 7 These concerns have become part of a
4. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1911 (1938); 3 R.
INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1938 (1941).
5. See, e.g., Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 ORE. L. REV.
259, 273-74 (1971).
6. See Schwabach, The Sandoz Spill: Failure of the Rhine Treaty Regime, 16 ECOLOGY
L.Q. (forthcoming 1989) ("17 million francs will be spent on programs to study and restore the
ecosystem of the Rhine").
7. The new Antarctic Minerals Treaty, for example, accords substantial value to the pres-
ervation of the Antarctic environment. Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resource Activities, art. 4(2), done at Wellington, June 2, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 868
(1988).
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legal discourse of sustainable development" and intergenerational
equity.9
Yet Part VI sets for itself a task that is factually and philosophically
much narrower. As the introductory note to Part VI explains, the sec-
tion "addresses primarily transfrontier and marine pollution."' 0 Thus
there is no mention, for example, of the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species, I' the World Heritage Convention,12 or the
Convention for the Protection of Wetlands. 13
The tone of Part VI is that of a government legal advisor concerned
with a State's rights and duties in the event of significant transfrontier
pollution. It misses the broader shared desire of many peoples to manage
the planet's resources in a sustainable manner. This governmental view
emerges in Part VI's emphasis on State obligations and responsibility for
transfrontier pollution, an emphasis taken despite the fact that many in-
ternational environmental conventions channel such obligations toward
private parties. In this sense, international environmental law often has
attempted to make the membrane of sovereignty as porous to private
legal and administrative action as it is to pollution. Certainly, States
have a very important role in such efforts because they give force to the
treaties through enabling legislation and enforcement. But it is the sub-
stantive transnational law created by such treaties that is the hope of
international environmental law, not the extremely remote chance that a
8. See, eg., THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR
COMMON FUTURE (1987).
9. See, eg., Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity, 11
ECOLOGY L.Q. 495 (1984).
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) pt. VI introductory note. The introductory notes acknowl-
edge that much is unaddressed, stating:
Environmental harm may be caused by activities other than pollution: a dam may
cause erosion, or irrigation may increase the salinity of a river. Other environmental
problems of international concern include the need to improve habitat and human settle-
ments; to protect archaeological treasures, cultural monuments, nature sanctuaries, en-
dangered fauna and flora, and migratory birds; to lessen the consequences of
deforestation, overfishing, and weather modification. Where activities in one state cause
environmental injuries in another state, the principles of this Part generally apply.
Id. I do not know why a problem such as increased salinity of a river is not regarded as
pollution. A few of the above-listed concerns, such as weather modification, are treated in the
reporters' notes.
11. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
done at Washington Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243,
reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1085 (1973).
12. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226. See Magraw, InternationalLaw
and Park Protection: A Global Responsibility, in OUR COMMON LANDS: DEFENDING THE NA-
TIONAL PARKS 143, 147-49, 162-63 (D. Simon ed. 1988).
13. Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat,




state would be held internationally responsible for failing to adequately
legislate and enforce.
Part VI is also statist in its presumption that international law is not
concerned with degradation of the environment within a country but
rather only the degradation of the environment of other countries.14 The
Restatement gives the impression that a State may allow pollution of its
own territory as long as it somehow stops the pollution from crossing the
border. In fact, international conventional law increasingly limits the
range of possibilities of internal environmental policy. The nitrogen ox-
ide protocol to the Long Range Air Pollution Convention speaks not
only of percentage reductions of emissions, but rather may lead to spe-
cific emission limitations for specific nitrogen oxide sources.' 5 Similarly,
the draft work of the International Law Commission on the law of non-
navigational uses of international watercourses implicitly recognizes the
shared interest of the watercourse states in several aspects of the internal
watercourse policy of any one of them.16 Indeed, the increasing internal
focus suggests that international environmental law will come to be re-
garded not only as a subset of international law but also as an aspect of
general environmental law and policy that differs from domestic environ-
mental law primarily in that the process of its formulation is horizontal
rather than vertical.
In this sense Part VI is to international environmental law as state
responsibility for injuries to aliens is to human rights law. It is the differ-
ence between a homeowner concerned about neighbors who may pose a
nuisance and a community articulating land-use policies.
II. The Restatement Takes a Narrow View of the Scope of the Law
of Transfrontier Pollution
The Restatement defines the foreign relations law of the United States
as:
(a) international law as it applies to the United States; and
(b) domestic law that has substantial significance for the foreign relations
of the United States or has other substantial international consequences.' 7
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 601 comment c ("International law does not address inter-
nal pollution ... ").
15. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Con-
cerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes, arts. 2(3)
and 6, done at Sofia Oct. 31, 1988, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 212 (1989).
16. See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fortieth Ses-
sion, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 45 (1988).
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 1.
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The law of transfrontier pollution should, therefore, encompass custom-
ary international law, numerous regional and global conventions to
which the United States is a party, and U.S. statutes regarding protection
of the environment that have substantial international implications.18 To
restate this law is a formidable task. This is particularly so given the
black letter style of the Restatement, although room for innovation ap-
pears to have been possible in this regard.19
The difficulty of this task is complicated by the fact that conventional
law regarding transfrontier pollution, like domestic environmental law,
has developed by type of pollution rather than in some comprehensive
fashion. Thus there is a treaty regime specific to oil pollution from ves-
sels and a regime specific to sulfur dioxide air emissions. This specificity
is in part a reflection of the variety of activities that lead to transfrontier
pollution. It is also a natural consequence of specialized agencies struc-
turing negotiations in a way that makes such discussions manageable and
increases the likelihood of any resulting treaty later entering into force.
The multiplicity of regimes is compounded further by the fact that
treaties for any given problem area often address only one of four func-
tional areas of policy-making regarding transfrontier pollution: (1) devel-
opment of institutional frameworks to facilitate cooperation; (2)
prevention of the occurrence of pollution; (3) response to and mitigation
of the damage of pollution which has occurred; and (4) compensation
and restoration. This tendency toward specificity in treaty regimes both
as to the pollution source involved and functional concern addressed
consequently yields an array through which each problem area can be
analyzed.20
Part VI largely avoids the challenge of restating this diverse and exten-
sive set of conventional regimes, unlike other Parts of the Restatement
18. Presumably, these statutes would include not only those relating to the environment
outside the United States, but also those addressing the environment within the United States
so long as there are substantial international implications.
19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) pt. VI introductory note ("As the previous Restatement
recognized, the form of a restatement of foreign relations law might well be different from that
of other restatements.").
20. An example of representative conventional instruments forming such an array for oil
pollution from vessels with would be:
Cooperation: Convention on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution
and the Protocols thereto, done Feb. 13, 1976, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 285
(1976).
Prevention: International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done
at London, Nov. 2, 1973, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973).
Response: Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, done at
Brussels Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 9 I.LM. 25 (1970).
Compensation: International Convention on Civil Liability of Oil Pollution Damage, done




which attempt to handle areas that are primarily conventional. The
black letter sections of Part III on the law of treaties, Part V on the law
of the sea, and the portion of Part VIII addressing trade law all draw
heavily upon conventions.21 Unlike the law of transfrontier pollution,
however, these other Parts generally draw upon only one convention.
22
In this sense, a restatement of the law of the environment that included
the conventional law would not only. be difficult to produce but also very
lengthy. Perhaps it is thus appropriate in this first effort that Part VI
assumes a more modest challenge. Unfortunately, even other less bur-
densome steps are not taken. For example, Part VI did not follow the
innovative approach used in the introductory note to Part VII dealing
with human rights. The introductory note to that Part compiles in a
table all the major human rights treaties, noting those to which the
United States is a party.23 This list provides a good indication of the
scope and status of the field and serves as a valuable reference. Although
the decision of the drafters to limit the scope of Part VI is somewhat
understandable, the decision not to restate the conventional law of the
environment led to a major loss in substantive provisions.24
Part VI is brief. It restates the environmental obligations of States in
section 601 and the remedies available for the violation of obligations in
section 602. Sections 603 and 604 essentially repeat the structure of the
first two sections, but with a particular focus on the marine environment.
Even in sections 603 and 604, -the black letter clauses only restate the
general umbrella provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and
not the many more substantive marine environmental protection conven-
tions. Only subsection 604(3) breaks new ground. In that subsection,
the most substantive marine environmental protection provisions of the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, those dealing with coastal state
and port state jurisdiction, are restated. Section 604(3), by far the long-
est black letter portion of Part VI, is an example of the approach that
Part VI could have taken for other important conventional provisions.
21. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 321, 322, 323 and the source notes following
each section.
22. 1 See 1976 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties for Part III; 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea for Part V; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for
Part VIII, Chapter 1.
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) pt. VII introductory note, at 148.
24. This great loss of substance is apparent in the fact that Part VI of the Restatement is
the only Part in the cross reference to "Key Numbers" and ALR annotations to have no cross
references.
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III. The Restatement of the Law of Transfrontier Pollution is Too
Certain and Occasionally Incorrect
Part VI excludes significant aspects of the law of the environment and,
even in its primary area of focus, transfrontier pollution, it eschews tack-
ling the extensive and diverse conventional law on the subject. Instead,
Part VI packs essentially everything into sections 601 and 602. The legal
propositions in these sections are sometimes conservative, sometimes
progressive, and almost always stated with too much conviction. The
recurring certainty with which propositions are stated in Part VI gives an
impression of overall stability to this area of law that is unwarranted, if
not inappropriate. While the black letter rules of a section may perhaps
need to be definite, the aspirational law and "soft law" of the environ-
ment should have been discussed in the comments and reporters' notes.
Basically, subsection 601(1) provides that each State has certain obli-
gations to avoid injury to the environment of another State or common
areas; sections 601(2) and (3) specify to whom and for what a State is
responsible when obligations under subsection 601(1) have been violated;
and section 602 describes very generally the public and private remedies
available to injured parties.2 5 The following brief analysis focuses on a
particularly important subsection of Part VI-subsection 601(1). This
subsection defines the extent of a State's obligation to prevent trans-
25. Given the brevity of sections 601 and 602, it is appropriate to reproduce them in full:
§ 601. State Obligations with Respect to Environment of Other States and the Common
Environment
(1) A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the extent practi-
cable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control
(a) conform to generally accepted international rules and standards for the prevention,
reduction, and control of injury to the environment of another state or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; and
(b) are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment of another
state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
(2) A state is responsible to all other states
(a) for any violation of its obligations under Sub-section (1)(a), and
(b) for any significant injury, resulting from such violation, to the environment of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
(3) A state is responsible for any significant injury, resulting from a violation of its
obligations under Sub-section (1), to the environment of another state or to its property,
or to persons or property within that state's territory or under its jurisdiction or control.
§ 602. Remedies for Violations of Environmental Obligations
(1) A state responsible to another state for violation of § 601 is subject to general inter-
state remedies (§ 902) to prevent, reduce, or terminate the activity threatening or causing
the violation, and to pay reparation for injury caused.
(2) Where pollution originating in a state has caused significant injury to persons
outside that state, or has created a significant risk of such injury, the state of origin is
obligated to accord to the person injured or exposed to such risk access to the same judi-




boundary environmental injury resulting from activities within its
jurisdiction.
Subsection 601(1) begins clearly enough: "A state is obligated to take
such measures as may be necessary. . . ." However, this obligation then
is limited by the phrase "to the extent practicable under the circum-
stances." Although this qualification points to a standard defined by cus-
tomary practice, the comments and reporters' notes do little to explain
the phrase.26 The phrase renders the obligation contextual;27 that is, the
obligation is not absolute but rather is dependent upon the circumstances
present and the limits of practicality. 2 8 The State's obligation to take
measures applies only to "activities within its jurisdiction or control."
The added notion of "control" makes clear that the obligations of a State
under subsection 601(2) extend to "activities on ships flying its flag or on
installations on the high seas operating under its authority."
29
The balance of subsection 601(1) provides that the measures should
ensure that the activities (a) "conform to generally accepted international
rules and standards for the prevention, reduction, and control of injury"
to the environment of another state or of the common environment, and
(b) "are conducted so as not to cause significant injury" to the environ-
ment of another state or of the common environment.
26. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 601(1) comment d ("In general, the applicable interna-
tional rules and standards do not hold a State responsible when it has taken the necessary and
practicable measures ... ").
27. See D. Magraw, Existing Legal Regime: The New International Economic Order and
Other Bases for Special or Contextual Treatment of Developing Countries (presented at
Nicholas R. Dorman Colloquium on International Law, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO,
Feb. 2, 1989).
28. Part VI appears to borrow heavily from the language of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention. That Convention, like almost all other major environmental treaties or resolu-
tions, explicitly recognizes that the obligation of a State is dependent upon the capabilities of
the State, and that special consideration consequently must be given to developing countries.
Part VI, like the Law of Sea Convention, provides that a State is only obliged to do what is
"practicable under the circumstances." Although this phrase could encompass the notion that
developing countries may have less stringent obligations, see PROCEEDINGS OF THE 60TH AN-
NUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 1983 518-19 (1984) [hereinafter PRO-
CEEDINGS], Part VI does not repeat the specific references of many conventions to developing
countries nor is the special position of developing countries alluded to in any comment or
reporters' note. Although Part VI refers many times to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Decla-
ration and its recognition of a State's duty to not cause transboundary environmental damage,
it does not mention Principle 23's recognition of the special position of developing countries.
One response to these omissions might be that Part VI is a restatement of U.S. foreign
relations law'and thus the special position of developing States need not be discussed. This is
correct, however, only if the United States is the defendant. The special position of developing
countries will be of central concern to U.S. plaintiffs seeking compensation for injuries result-
ing from activities under the jurisdiction or control of, for example, Mexico.
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 601 comment c; see also Handl, State Liability for Acciden-
tal Transnational Environmental Damage by Private Persons, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1980).
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Although section 601 can be described generally in this way, specific
questions concerning it are not easily answered. For example, subsec-
tions 601(2) and (3) provide that a State is responsible for violations of its
obligations in subsection 601(1). Subsection 601(1) sets forth two dis-
tinct obligations in subparagraphs (a) and (b). Interpreting either of
these obligations, however, presents difficulties.
Subsection 601(1)(b) is the traditional branch of a State's environmen-
tal obligation. The obligation is to prevent a certain result, namely, sig-
nificant transboundary environmental injury. The obligation is absolute
in that it requires measures to "ensure" that significant transboundary
environmental injury does not occur. It is contextual in that the meas-
ures need only be those practicable under the circumstances. Whether
measures practicable under the circumstances are more or less exacting
than reasonable measures is unclear. To the extent that the phrase
"practicable under the circumstances" leads subsection 601(1) in effect to
require a standard of care akin to due diligence, the section adopts a
conservative view of the environmental obligation of States. Indeed, the
black letter provisions make no mention of the possibility of strict liabil-
ity for certain ultrahazardous activities such as nuclear power genera-
tion. Instead, the possibility of strict liabilty is relegated to a brief
discussion in comments d and f. Comment d appears to adopt the simi-
larly conservative view that strict liability of States may be provided for
in conventional law but does not exist customarily.30 Comment f, mean-
while, without reference to a specific treaty, states that under "interna-
tional law, a state engaged in weather modification activities is
responsible for any significant injuries ... even if the injury was neither
intended nor due to negligence, and even if the state took all necessary
measures to prevent or reduce injury."'31
I do not take issue here with these conservative positions, but rather
object to the certainty with which they are stated. No mention is made
of the extensive scholarly literature on strict liability under customary
law or the discussions of the International Law Commission on the is-
sue.32 The certainty with which comment f states that a State is strictly
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 601 comment d ("In general, the applicable international
rules and standards do not hold a State responsible when it has taken the necessary and practi-
cable measures; some international agreements provide also for responsibility regardless of
fault . . ").
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 601 comment f. The comment then suggests that the reader
compare this provision with the rule on abnormally dangerous activities in comment d.
32. See generally J. SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT ch. 6
(1979); Jenks, Liability for Ultra-hazardous Activities in International Law, 117 RECUEIL DES
COURS 99 (1966); Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of Interna-
tional Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1189 (1965); Goldie, International Principles of Responsi-
Vol. 14:528, 1989
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liable for weather modification is doubly troubling because the reporters'
note offers only contrary evidence. 33
The second obligation is set out in subsection 601(l)(a): each State
shall take measures to ensure that its activities conform to "generally
accepted international rules and standards." Unlike the requirement in
subsection 601(l)(b), this obligation requires States to ensure that activi-
ties are conducted in a certain manner rather than that such activities do
not result in transboundary injury. Unfortunately, the Restatement does
not define the parameters of the required conduct: what is encompassed
in the phrase "generally accepted international rules and standards"? 34
The phrase could refer only to rules and standards that international law
considers part of customary law or that are directly applicable because
the parties accepted them. 35 Comment b does not appear to support this
interpretation, however. It -provides that in addition to applicable treaty
rules and standards, the obligation in subsection 601(l)(a) encompasses
"both general rules of customary international law.., and those derived
from international conventions, and from standards adopted by interna-
bilityfor Pollution, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283 (1970); Quentin-Baxter, Third Report on
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by Interna-
tional Law, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/360, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 51 (1982), UN Doc. No.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add. 1 (pt. 1).
33. The conventions cited in reporters' note 7 do not support the existence of a strict liabil-
ity principle. In the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military Use or Any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, done May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S.
No. 9614, the State Parties undertake not to engage in hostile uses of weather modification
techniques as a means of injury to other State Parties. This convention thus has little to do
with strict liability because it addresses a situation where the injury is precisely the intended
result.
The second source cited, World Meteorological Organization/United Nations Environmen-
tal Program Informal Meeting of Experts on Legal Aspects of Weather Modification, Draft
Principles of Conduct for the Guidance of States Concerning Weather Modification, [1978] DI-
GEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INT'L L. 1204-05, does not establish a strict liability principle
either. Article VI requires that "all reasonable steps" be taken to ensure that a state's weather
modification activities do not cause outside adverse environmental affects. Id. at 1205. This
suggests the same general standard described in comment d of section 601, that a State which
has taken such preventive measures is not responsible for unintended effects.
As for the third convention cited, the 1975 United States-Canada Agreement Relating to the
Exchange of Information on Weather Modification Activities, 26 U.S.T. 540, T.I.A.S. No.
8056, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 589 (1975), it explicitly states in article VII: "Nothing herein
relates to or shall be construed to affect the question of responsibility or liability for weather
modification activities, or to imply the existence of any generally applicable rule of interna-
tional law."
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 601(1)(a).
35. The phrase also could be read to require a lower standard of conduct than that con-
sented to by a State in an international agreement when the rules and standards agreed to by
the State are not generally accepted. This possible interpretation is negated by comment b
which provides that a "St'ate is also obligated to comply with an environmental rule or stan-
dard that has been accepted by both it and an injured state, even if that rule or standard has
not been generally accepted." Id. § 601 comment b.
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tional organizations."' 36 Discussions regarding this phrase on the floor of
the American Law Institute only confirm the language's lack of preci-
sion.37 The suggestion that a State should be bound by rules and stan-
dards that are neither customarily nor conventionally applicable is
unusual to say the least. This confusing phrase apparently was adopted
because of its use elsewhere: "This phrase is adopted from the law of the
sea." 38 Indeed, the phrase appears a number of times in the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention. For example, article 211(2) of the Law of the Sea
Convention provides:
States shall adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution of the marine environment from vessels flying their flag
or of their registry. Such laws and regulations shall at least have the same
effect as that of generally accepted international rules and standards estab-
lished through the competent international organization or general diplo-
matic conference. 39
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 28, at 520-21:
PROFESSOR OSCAR S. GRAY (Md.): [A]re we suggesting that the United States
would in some way be subject to liability for having permitted emissions according to
standards which were acceptable under American environmental control legislation but
were not acceptable under something called generally accepted standards?
PROFESSOR HENKIN: . . ."Generally accepted" to me means accepted by the
United States as well. If the United States dissents from it, it is no longer generally ac-
cepted....
PROFESSOR SOHN: Yes. "Generally accepted" means accepted by a preponderant
majority of the world, including the United States.
PROFESSOR GRAY: Including the United States.
PROFESSOR SOHN: Yes. If the United States or Soviet Union or several important
countries in other parts of the world do not accept it, then it is not generally accepted.
PROFESSOR GRAY: Then, by the same token, what about the Third World Country
which is attempting to industrialize...? Are we suggesting that we would claim that the
individual country which had refused to accept the generally accepted standards is subject
to some liability?...
PROFESSOR SOHN: It might be liable if damage occurred to some other country.
PROFESSOR GRAY: In other words, "generally accepted" does not necessarily mean
accepted by the country against which the claim is made unless that country is the United
States.
PROFESSOR HENKIN: Or some other big power....
PROFESSOR SOHN: As far as Third World countries are concerned, they rely on
solidarity. If one of them objects to something, usually the others object together on
it ... In such a case also the standard would not be "generally acceptable."
This lengthy quote should not be taken to suggest that there was extensive debate on Part
VI. To the contrary, the official record is quite brief.
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 601 comment b. Likewise, as Professor Henkin pointed out
during the Institute's discussions, the phrase "originates in the marine field" was taken from
the law of sea. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 28, at 521.
39. 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1310. The phrase appears in other provisions, but not always with
such force. See id. arts. 207-10, 212.
Vol. 14:528, 1989
Restatement: Environmental Law
A study of the phrases used in that Convention, however, suggests that
transfer of this provision to a general restatement of international envi-
ronmental law is problematic at best.
First, it is unclear whether article 211(2) is codifying or progressively
developing international law. If the Convention is attempting the latter,
then by agreeing to the Law of the Sea Convention, States consent to the
application of generally accepted rules and standards that would not
otherwise be customarily or conventionally applicable.4° Second, even if
article 211(2), relating to vessel source pollution, reflects custom, the
Law of the Sea Convention does not require conformity with generally
accepted rules and standards for all sources of marine pollution. In par-
ticular, in the cases of atmospheric and land-based pollution of the
marine environment, the Convention only requires that States "take ac-
count of" internationally accepted rules and standards.41 Third, neither
the meaning nor the use of the language in the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion is without controversy.42
Finally, both the 601(a) and (b) obligations are progressive in that they
extend not only to the environment of other States but also to areas be-
yond the territorial limits of national jurisdiction. The comments and
reporters' notes neither adequately support this proposition nor note
what is arguably contrary conventional practice. For example, reporters'
note 9, entitled "Impact Abroad or Upon the Global Commons," is de-
voted almost entirely to whether the U.S. National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 has extraterritorial effect. As to arguably contrary conven-
tional practice, the reporters' notes fail to mention, for example, that the
Civil Liability Convention for Oil Pollution from Vessels, despite its
40. See Nanda, Protection of the Internationally Shared Environment and the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea, in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED
STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 403, 412 (J. van Dyke ed. 1985).
41. 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1310, 1311 at arts. 207(1), 212(1).
42. See, e.g., Clingan, Vessel-Source Pollution, Problems of Hazardous Cargo, and Port
State Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION: ROCKS AND SHOALS AHEAD? 273 (J.
Van Dyke, L. Alexander & J. Morgan eds. 1988).
First, there is bound to be confusion regarding standard setting. The treaty, in various
provisions, uses on the one hand the term "generally accepted" international standards,
and on the other the term "applicable" international standards. It is not clear what the
distinction is. Furthermore, it is certainly not clear what makes an international standard
"generally acceptable." Certainly there is an implication that these standards should arise
from international agreement. But how widespread should that agreement be and must a
state be a party to those agreements before being bound? Presumably, these questions will
require further considerations in an approximate forum, probably the IMO.
Id. at 275.
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broad title, applies only to damage occurring in the territory or in the
territorial waters of contracting parties. 43
Similarly troubling ambiguities, if not inaccuracies, exist elsewhere in
Part VI. Subsection 601(2), for example, provides that a State is respon-
sible "to all other States" for violations of its obligations under subsec-
tion 601(1)(a). Is this provision to be read as implying that the obligation
in subsection 601(1)(a) is erga omnes, or is the reference in subsection
601(2) to "all other states" to be read as "potentially affected States"? If
for no other reason, ambiguities are virtually inevitable given that the
compactness of Part VI easily allows multiple interpretations. For all
these reasons, scholarly or judicial reference to Part VI of the Restate-
ment must be made with great care.
Conclusion
Part VI of the Restatement is an important symbolic step, but unfortu-
nately, one of quite modest substantive value. It does not address the full
scope of the law of the environment, but rather only one major portion,
the law of transfrontier pollution. Even in addressing this aspect of the
law of the environment, Part VI does not take on fully the challenge of
restating the law embodied in the many conventions addressing the di-
verse sources and types of transfrontier pollution. The more modest ef-
forts to restate all of the law of transfrontier pollution in sections 601 and
602 unfortunately yielded overly certain and occasionally incorrect state-
ments. Overall, the resulting product is too general for the specialist and
too confusing for the novice.
In reviewing Part VI, I came to question generally the value of a re-
statement effort when the majority of the law would be statutory or, as in
this case, conventional. The value of an effort of course turns upon its
objective. The style of writing and organization suggests that the Re-
statement was intended to aid the specialist, not to inform the generalist.
The difficulty is that if the Restatement is to aid judges, government offi-
cials and practicioners, why should such persons refer to a black letter
restatement of conventional law when they could go directly to the pri-
mary document? If the Restatement were more in the form of a narrative
survey, however, it could guide such specialists to the relevant primary
43. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, art. 2, done at
Brussels Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970). See
also Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for
and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, art. 2(b), done at London May 1, 1977, re-




documents of conventional law and simultaneously help set a research
and legislative agenda for international environmental law.44
The task of restating the law of the environment is both important and
formidable. The Institute is to be congratulated for taking the first step
toward such a restatement. But the waterways of this law have many
more branches than Part VI of the Restatement suggests, and many of
those branches may be shifting. Although Part VI of the Restatement
provides the first general chart, navigators are well advised to use it with
caution. In time, there will be more detailed and accurate charts. Part
VI's honor lies in its distinction of being the first edition.
44. A survey of the law addressing the carriage of hazardous chemicals at sea, for example,
could describe the effort to encourage prevention through packaging and strategic loading
requirements, clarify expectations regarding response through the Protocol Relating to Inter-
vention on the High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances Other Than Oil, done at
London Nov. 2, 1973, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 605 (1974), and most importantly, point out the
continuing reliance on general state and private remedies for injury, since unlike the area of oil
pollution from vessels, there is not yet a liability convention in this area. For a recent example
of such an analytic effort, see, e.g., Handl, Transboundary Nuclear Accidents: The Post-
Chernobyl Multilateral Legislative Agenda, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 203 (1988).
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